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Introduction—Why are we looking at the MK 48 Case?
DoD Logistics Today
 Spend over $90 Billion/year ($126 Billion in FY 04 with the 
Supplemental)
 Employ approx. 1 Million government people
 Have an inventory of approx. $67 Billion
 But do not do a world-class job, by any measure (response 
time, flexibility, cost, etc.)
 Logistics has been a major problem in Iraq, and it is critical to 21st
Century warfighting
 DoD Logistics has little cost visibility or performance accountability
We need to work to realize the potential for 
dramatic improvement in performance,
with billions of dollars of savings.
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Opportunity for Improved Performance at Lower Cost
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Background— The MK 48
 The MK 48 (or MK 48 ADCAP) 
is carried by all Navy attack and 
ballistic missile submarines.
 Both variants are designed to 
combat fast, deep diving nuclear 
submarines and high 
performance surface ships. 
 Both can operate with or without 
wire guidance and use active 
and/or passive homing. 
 The MK 48 has been 
operational in the U.S. Navy 
since 1972.
 The MK 48 Advanced Capability 
(ADCAP) became operational in 
1988 and was approved for full 
production in 1989. 
 The ADCAP has significantly 
increased capabilities over the 
MK 48. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 Length: 19 feet 
 Diameter: 21 inches 
 Weight: 3434 lbs (MK 48), 3695 lbs 
(ADCAP) 
 Speed: Greater than 28 kts 
 Power Plant: Piston engine; pump jet 
 Range: Greater than 5 miles; 
 Depth: Greater than 1200 ft
 Warhead: 650 lbs high explosive
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Background—MK-48 Life Cycle Model
 The MK 48 torpedoes are upgraded and modified by 
Raytheon at their facility in Keyport (the Navy Depot is also 
at Keyport)
 The MK 48 IMA mission is to provide essential torpedo 
maintenance services and ready for issue weapons to the 
submarine fleet
 Refuel, and prep for reuse as an exercise torpedo or convert 
to a warshot (nominally after 10 in-water runs).
 Warshot periodic maintenance
 Warshot verification 
 Occasional R&D as directed
 The Intermediate maintenance is conducted at three 
facilities:
 Keyport—manned by government civilians
 Yorktown—manned primarily by active duty sailors
 Pearl Harbor—outsourced to Raytheon
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Background—MK 48 IMAs
 Three Facilities Yorktown, Pearl 
Harbor, Keyport
 Yorktown and Pearl Harbor were 
virtual mirror images prior to the 
outsourcing
 During 1990s active duty sailor 
resources were in large demand
 In June 1999, CinCPACFLT 
made the decision to convert the 
sailor billets at the Naval 
Magazine, Pearl Harbor to 
civilian positions 
 Then, outsource the  IMA to a 
contractor—transitioning in FY01
 Contract competitively awarded 
to Raytheon in Apr 2000, with 4 
one year options
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Initial Raytheon Contract
 The original contract goals 
were to:
 Process and issue 
approximately 360 full and 
partial weapon maintenance 
actions
 Meet 100% of fleet deliveries 
(in needed time)
 Demonstrate required 
reliability and availability 
standards
 Maintain a flexible planning 
process to adapt to schedule 
changes
 “Since the scope and type of 
work is well defined, a fixed 
price contract is anticipated.”
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Initial Contract Incentives
 There was also a separate incentive to reduce the use of government 




$325, 00065%Torpedo Quality Indicators* (QI)
Incentive Fee 
Allocated Per Period
% of Incentive PoolCategory
Incentive Fee Allotment per Incentive Category
* Quality Indicators Include sub-categories of reliability, availability, and warshot sampling
 The original contract (approx $4M to $7M per year) provided the 
following incentives structure
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Follow-on Contract
 Sole-source contract signed with Raytheon in Apr 
2006 (approx $9M per year), with one option year
$40,00010%Supply
$80,00020%Fleet Failure Analysis (FFA) Hold
$280,00070%Torpedo Workmanship Failure 
Evaluation Quality
Incentive Fee Allocated 
Per Period
% of Incentive PoolIncentive Category
Incentive Fee Allotment Categories
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Demonstrated Results in Other Programs
Performance Based Logistics
F-14 LANTIRN











Material Availability Logistics Response Time
Pre-PBL Post-PBL
56.9 Days 5 Days
52.7 Days 8 Days
42.6 Days 2 Days CONUS7 Days OCONUS
28.9 Days 2 Days CONUS
4 Days OCONUS
35 Days 6.5 Days
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Demonstrated Results in Other Programs






Oct-01 Apr-02 Oct-02 Apr-03 Oct-03 Apr-04
AIMD Lemoore Power Plants Shop
F404 Engine Repair Cycle Time in Days
ADUSD(MR&MP) Dave Pauling
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Demonstrated Results in Other Programs




















Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal Employees?
Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, October 2004 
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Demonstrated Results in Other Programs
CNA Study of Long-Run Costs of Competitive Sourcing


















¨ Expected Savings (as bid by winner – government or private)                           35%
¨ Observed Savings (realized results, including scope & quantity changes)         24%
¨ Effective Savings (realized results on same scope & quantity)  34%
Long run Costs and Performance 
Effects of Competitive Sourcing
CNA,  February 2001
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Strengths of Outsourcing 
 Outsourcing is more efficient and generally reduces costs 
significantly because:
 It harnesses competition--brings the pressure of the marketplace to bear 
on the inefficient producers.
 It permits better management control--frees government managers of 
most of the distracting influences e.g. civil service constraints.
 Managers can see more directly the costs and benefits of their 
decisions.
 Outsourcing enables the government to take advantage of 
specialized skills, new technology, and innovation that are often 
lacking in its own organization.
 Outsourcing can reduce dependence on a single supplier (i.e., the 
government), and the potential for future competition provides a
continuing incentive for higher performance at lower cost.
Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of 
Government as the Provider, Jacques S. Gansler, June 2003, 
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Meanwhile…
 Yorktown is still manned 
primarily by active duty 
sailors.
 Use sailors on a 3 year 
shore rotation
 Many of the technicians are 
torpedo-men 
 Highly motivated workforce 
with ties to the fleet
 6 month qualification with 8 
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Raytheon Results
 Raytheon signed a bridge contract in 
Nov 2005 to Apr 2006 to complete 
the work from the original contract
 The Navy paid for security, to allow 
Raytheon to complete the required 
number of torpedoes—Raytheon was 
approximately 200 torpedoes behind
 At Pearl Harbor the effort for an 
exercise to exercise torpedo takes 
approx. 350 man hrs 
 Aggregate data Yorktown and 
Keyport is 250-260 man hrs for an 
equivalent turn.
 Cost per employee is approximately 
$50,000 a year less per employee at 
Yorktown, than Pearl harbor
Raytheon results are counterintuitive.  Although government 
employees are generally cheaper, both measures at Pearl 
Harbor IMA are going the wrong way i.e. more man-hours at a 
higher rate
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Preliminary Observations
 Contract
 Fixed price contract may not have been the most appropriate 
 Second contract was sole source, in spite of performance
 Contract incentives did not work
 Since contractor must use gov’t furnished parts, there is limited 
impact on availability, reliability
 Supply incentive in first contract created perverse incentive—
parts were stockpiled until the last year, then turned in
 Limited use of metrics 
 The Torpedo Enterprise Optimization program, tracked the 
rework statistics at all three of the IMAs
 Collecting the data was viewed a burden and the requirement 
was eliminated—Yorktown still uses them
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Preliminary Observations (cont)
 Employees
 Oahu has a limited pool of individuals qualified for the work 
that can also get a security clearance
 Contractor does not use the Yorktown formal training program
 Living in paradise, “If you have to work at all in Hawaii, you’re 
working too much”
 Process Improvement
 IMA is staffed by Raytheon employees, but uses Gov’t facility, 
tools, parts, and procedures
 There are many ordinance related restrictions—it is not a 
contractor owned process, and therefore more difficult to 
reengineer, innovate, and improve
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Lessons Learned
Otherwise:
 Use the power of competition
 To the degree possible, allow 
flexibility and empowerment 
 Develop meaningful metrics
 Measurement is key to 
performance improvement and 
problem identification
 Metrics should be understandable, 
economical, timely, and 
improvement oriented
 Improve contract incentives
 Improve training
 Take advantage of the in-
residence program
 Courses are also available online
If you want what you’ve always had, do what you’ve always 
done
